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Abstract 
This paper identifies and discusses recent information privacy violations or weaknesses which have been found 
in national infrastructure systems in Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America 
(USA), two of which involve departments of health and social services. The feasibility of health information 
systems (HIS) based upon intrinsically more secure technological architectures than those in general use in 
today's marketplace is investigated.  We propose a viable and sustainable IT solution which addresses the 
privacy and security concerns at all levels in HIS with a focus on trustworthy access control mechanisms.   
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Introduction 
Today’s service industries would regard information, computer and telecommunication (ICT) technologies as 
part of their critical infrastructure. Although some sectors such as healthcare, have been slow in their adoption 
of ICT, it is evident they are working towards a future where ICT technologies will be both widespread and 
essential. The use of computer-based information systems and associated telecommunications infrastructure to 
process, transmit and store health information plays an increasingly significant role in the improvement of 
quality and productivity in healthcare. Notwithstanding the obvious potential advantages of deploying ICT in 
healthcare services, there are some concerns associated with integration of and access to electronic health 
records.  Information stored within electronic health systems is highly sensitive by its very nature, therefore 
health records have clear requirements for confidentiality in order to safeguard personal privacy and to maintain 
record integrity. 
A security violation in a health information system (HIS), such as an unauthorised disclosure or unauthorised 
alteration of individual health information, has the potential for disaster among healthcare providers and 
consumers. Although the concept of Electronic Health Records (EHR) has much potential for improving the 
processing of health data, Goldschmidt (Goldschmidt 2005) warns that electronic health records may also pose 
new threats for compromising sensitive personal health data if not designed and managed effectively. 
Goldschmidt also illustrates that malevolent motivations could feasibly disclose confidential personal health 
information on a more massive scale and at a higher speed than possible with traditional paper-based medical 
records.  Quinn suggests that the key factor to successful implementation of a national health information system 
is user adoption (Quinn 2004).  User acceptability and adoption in e-health relies on the healthcare consumers’ 
willingness to overcome the fear of privacy invasion in relation to their health information. There is also the 
factor of the healthcare service providers’ willingness to accept and adopt a new technology that does not 
always facilitate efficient working practices.  To encourage healthcare service consumers and providers to use 
electronic health records, it is crucial to instil confidence that the electronic health information is well protected 
and that consumers' privacy is assured.   
Several countries including Australia, the UK, the USA, Canada and New Zealand are actively involved in the 
development of e-health initiatives.  The current approaches to protecting personal privacy and confidentiality of 
electronic patient records are, in the opinion of the authors, not sustainable.  This paper identifies and discusses 
three scenarios related to information privacy violations or weaknesses which have recently been found in 
Australia, the UK and the USA.  The paper proposes a viable ICT solution to provide appropriate levels of 
secure access control for the protection of sensitive health data.  Increasingly, HIS are being developed and 
deployed based upon commercial, commodity-level ICT products and systems.  Such general-purpose systems 
have been created over the last 25 years with often only the minimal security functionality and verification.  In 
particular access control, a vital security function in any operating system that forms the basis for application 
packages, has been founded upon earlier designs based on an access control method known as Discretionary 
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Access Control (DAC) as described in later sections.  DAC systems were defined around an environment where 
data and program resources were developed and deployed within a single enterprise, assuming implicit trust 
amongst users.  This environmental model is no longer valid for modern HIS.  In some commercial systems, for 
example, even the addition of a simple single printer unit has the capacity to seriously undermine the overall 
integrity of the information system.   
This paper investigates the feasibility of HIS based upon intrinsically more secure technological architectures 
than those in general use in today's marketplace.  Even though such systems are currently commercially 
available for enterprise system deployment, for example SELinux, they are not in widespread use.  The privacy 
and security issues required of HIS applications are analysed in the context of a new approach to a more 
trustworthy structure, the Open Trusted Health Informatics Scheme (OTHIS).  This scheme consists of a number 
of trusted models including the Health Informatics Access Control (HIAC) system which is discussed in detail. 
Access Control 
Access control is one of the fundamental security mechanisms used to protect computer resources, in particular 
in multi-user and resource-sharing computer environments. “Access control” simply refers to a set of rules that 
specify which users can access what resources with which types of access restrictions. Various operating 
systems, network control systems, and database management systems (DBMS) can employ a choice of access 
control mechanisms to allow admission of a user to access protected resources of the system.  It should be noted 
that in any information system a distinction may be made between “security aware applications” and “security 
ignorant applications”.  These latter applications usually depend solely upon access control facilities provided by 
an operating system, DBMS and other like middleware.  Controlling appropriate access to data in any 
information system is a major security issue.  Many instances of poor access control management practices 
leading to security and privacy violations are reported on a regular basis.  Recent occurrences include: 
Scenario 1: Privacy Invasion Scandal at Australia’s Centrelink 
Australia’s Centrelink, a Commonwealth Government agency, delivers a range of social welfare services and 
payments to the Australian community including issuing Health Care Cards for concessions on healthcare costs.  
In carrying out its duties, Centrelink officers may verify information on personal financial and tax records with 
the Australian Taxation Office (ATO).  According to a published media article (Sharanahan & Karvelas 2006), 
Centrelink conducted a two-year investigation on invasion of privacy by deploying spyware technology to audit 
and monitor employees’ access to client records.  The results of this investigation found 790 cases of 
inappropriate access to client records since 2004.  Consequently, 19 IT staff were dismissed, 92 resigned, more 
than 300 staff faced salary deductions or fines, another 46 were reprimanded and the remainder were demoted or 
warned.  Introduction of the proposed Medical access card in Australia, which may encompass healthcare 
parameters as well as social security information, is particularly concerning given the findings of this 
investigation.  
Analysis 1: The information collected and stored by Centrelink is of a highly sensitive nature.  It is therefore 
essential that the privacy and integrity of such information is safeguarded from internal and external security 
threats and attacks.  Centrelink deploys spyware software to detect inappropriate access to client records and 
enforces the penalty for persons convicted in breach, however such steps only deal with occurrences of privacy 
violations in a reactive manner.  It is preferable to adopt a proactive tamper resistant protection approach where 
such incidents simply cannot occur.  The authors propose that this can be achieved by employing the appropriate 
technological controls to prevent unauthorised access or alteration of the private information ensuring 
individuals’ privacy and integrity of their information. 
Scenario 2: A Lack of Adequate Safeguards to Access UK NHS Patient Records 
The current UK National Programme for IT (NPfIT) is considered to be the world’s largest ICT project 
providing an HIS for 50 million patients.  It has been reported by the media (Leigh & Evans 2006) that a lack of 
adequate security measures is in place regarding providing access to shared patient records once they are on the 
national database system.  Patient records may contain sensitive information such as mental illness, abortions, 
pregnancy, HIV status, drug-taking or alcoholism.  The article warns that the 50 million patient records may be 
made accessible by up to 250,000 National Health Services (NHS) staff including police and health managers, 
counsellor, social workers, private medical practices, ambulance staff and commercial researchers.  This has 
resulted in calls for a boycott of patient records accessible by thousands of authorised NHS staff.  
Analysis 2: The confidentiality management approach deployed by the UK NHS to access patient records will 
be on a “need-to-know” basis.  Varied access permissions, based on the role-based access policy, will be granted 
to access patient records.  In its basic form this is a simplistic approach which will not satisfactorily address the 
primary issue of a lack of adequate safeguards.  In particular this approach does not allow patients to selectively 
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protect particular parts of their uploaded information from being widely accessed.  NHS declares that a “sealed 
envelope” (NHS 2005) mechanism will allow patients to express access restrictions on disclosure of their 
confidential health information from specific roles.  The provision of sealed envelopes however will not be 
available until the second phase of the release of the NHS Care Record Service. 
Scenario 3: Significant IT Security Weaknesses Identified at USA HHS Information Systems 
A published security analysis report from the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) (GAO 
2006) assessed the effectiveness of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) information security 
program with emphasis on the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).  The GAO’s report reveals 
numerous significant security weaknesses in the areas of network management, user accounts and passwords, 
user rights and file permissions, and the auditing and monitoring of security-related events, specifically with 
HHS unnecessarily granting access rights and permissions to sensitive files and directories. 
HHS provides essential health and welfare services to the USA community.  CMS, a major operating division 
within HHS, is responsible for the Medicare and Medicaid programs.  HHS is highly reliant on networked 
information systems to carry out their services including processing medical claims, conducting medical 
research, managing health and disease prevention, and a food safety program.  Because such information 
systems contain sensitive medical and financial information, it is essential that the security and integrity of such 
information systems are safeguarded from security threats and vulnerabilities.  
Analysis 3: The identified security weaknesses in the HHS information systems increase the very high risk that 
unauthorised users can gain access to and subvert the systems upon which HHS relies to deliver its vital 
services. Not surprisingly, this has the potential to expose clients’ sensitive information to serious privacy 
invasions. GAO’s recommendation (GAO 2006) to HHS is to implement a complete set of comprehensive 
information security programs at all operating divisions to address the identified weaknesses.   
The three illustrated scenarios all have a common security weakness issue which is directly related to access 
control management.  Appropriate computer-based access control schemes can be deployed to address these 
information security issues.   Access control mechanisms, then, are used to restrict users’ accesses to resources.  
Organisations use these controls to grant employees the authority to access only the information the users need 
to perform their duties.  Access controls can limit the activities that an employee can perform on data.  Before 
proposing a viable solution to provide appropriate levels of secure access control for protecting sensitive health 
data, one must first understand the primary types of computer-based access control.  These are examined in the 
following section.  
Access Control models 
The two traditional types of access control modes are Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory 
Access Control (MAC).  The Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) concept is complementary to both DAC and 
MAC techniques.  RBAC enables easier management by ensuring finer granularity in the access system.  
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
The DAC mechanism is widely implemented for the purpose of managing access control by current commodity 
software such as Microsoft Corporation’s Windows systems, open-source systems such as Linux and the 
original Unix system.  The DAC policy allows the owner of information to grant access permissions to other 
users or programs at his/her discretion without the system administrator’s knowledge.  Each user has complete 
discretion over his/her own objects.  Thus, such a policy does not provide the actual owner of the system fully 
centralised access control over the organisational resources.  In fact, the system cannot identify the difference 
between a legitimate request to modify access control information which originated from the owner of the 
information and a request issued by a malicious program (Gasser 1988).  
DAC mechanisms are fundamentally inadequate for strong system security.  One of the major deficiencies with 
DAC is its vulnerability to some types of Trojan horse attacks.  Trojan horses embedded in applications can 
exploit DAC’s vulnerability to cause an illegal flow of information.  Applications that rely on DAC mechanisms 
are vulnerable to tampering and bypassing (Loscocco & Smalley 2001).  Malicious or flawed applications can 
easily cause security violations in the system.  This shortcoming of DAC can be overcome by employing MAC 
policies to prevent information flow from higher to lower security levels. 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
Gasser (Gasser 1988) states that MAC can be used to prevent some types of Trojan horse attacks by imposing 
severe access restrictions that cannot be bypassed intentionally or accidentally.  MAC can provide the ability to 
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limit access to only legitimate users.  Ferraiolo et al (Ferraiolo, Kuhn & Chandramouli 2003) underscore that 
MAC is necessary when provision of a truly secure system is required. 
With MAC, each user possesses a clearance that is used by the system to determine whether a user can access a 
particular file.  Access permissions are determined by a user’s clearance compared with the sensitivity (or 
security) or classification level label on information stored in the system, not upon the user’s discretion.  The 
classification may contain an arbitrary number of categories; for example a conventional hierarchical category 
set used in military environments might include “top secret”, “secret”, “confidential” and “unclassified”.  Each 
user possesses a clearance that is used by the system to determine whether a user can access a particular file.  
The access permission to information is determined by the user’s clearance compared to the security level of 
information stored in the system.  This is also known as a multi-level security (MLS) policy, which was first 
introduced by Bell and LaPadula (BLP) (Bell & LaPadula 1973).   
With the MLS policy, BLP propose an access control system in the form of a mathematical model for defining 
and evaluating computer security.  This model is designed to address the enforcement of information 
confidentiality aimed at the prevention of unauthorised information leakage.  The BLP model defines two basic 
rules for making access control decisions: the Simple property and the Star property.  The Simple property 
regulates whether a subject is allowed to read an object (i.e. if the subject’s clearance level dominates the 
security level of the object).  It is also known as the “no read up” policy.  The Star property determines whether 
a subject is allowed to write to an object (i.e. if the security level of the object dominates the subject’s security 
clearance level).  It is referred to as the “no write down” policy (Ferraiolo, Kuhn & Chandramouli 2003; Gasser 
1988).   
The traditional MAC policy was originally designed for a military environment based on the MLS hierarchical 
structure and was quite rigid in its application.  More recent research has modernised the traditional MAC 
approach, overcoming its traditional limitations, in order to better suit contemporary applications such as for the 
HIS environment.   
Role-based Access Control (RBAC) 
RBAC is based upon the role concept in managing access control where access permissions are associated with 
roles.  Users are assigned to appropriate roles within the organisation.  The user must be assigned as a member 
of a role in order to perform an operation on an object.  Ferraiolo et al (Ferraiolo, Kuhn & Chandramouli 2003) 
state that the driving force behind the RBAC model is to simplify the management of authorisation.  Assigning 
users’ access permissions to each protected object in the system on an individual user basis, particularly in large 
scale enterprise systems, is an onerous process in security management.  With RBAC, users are granted 
membership into roles according to their responsibilities and competencies.  User membership of roles can be 
included and revoked easily.  Updates of assigning privileges can be done to roles rather than updating 
permission assignments for individual users. RBAC supports users' access rights based on such parameters as 
job function, enforcement of least privilege for administrators and users, enforcement of static/dynamic 
separation of duties (SOD) and hierarchical definitions of roles.   
In spite of several advanced RBAC features, RBAC also brings a number of limitations.  Significantly, Reid et 
al (Reid et al. 2003) point out that RBAC does not efficiently support access policies in the way of general 
consent qualified by explicit denials.  This issue is quite apparent in the privacy vulnerability that occurred in the 
UK NHS patient record system analysed in Scenario 2.  There is also a lack of available products to support the 
full features of RBAC.  A number of research papers discuss the use of the RBAC mechanism for authorisation 
management in healthcare environments, since role models are suitable for the representation of roles in hospital 
settings.  Ferraiolo et al (Ferraiolo, Kuhn & Chandramouli 2003), the developers of the first model for RBAC 
and proposers of the RBAC standard, state that RBAC is policy-independent and policy neutral in not enforcing 
any particular protection policy.  Ferraiolo et al also point out that the availability of RBAC does not obviate the 
need for MAC and DAC policies.  MAC is particularly needed when confidentiality and information flow are 
primary concerns.   
Rethink Access Control Models in HIS 
Current moves toward Web-based identity and authentication structures present a major challenge where such 
structures are not based on highly trusted operating systems.  All applications and supporting software which 
necessarily reside atop the untrusted operating systems are also untrusted.  We emphasise the need for further 
research into, and redefinition of, MAC in light of modern information system structures, legislative and 
regulatory requirements and flexible operational demands in HIS.  
Building upon experience with DAC and MAC structures, indications are that a radical re-think is required in 
the understanding of access control in general in current and future information systems, and in particular in the 
healthcare environment.  One limiting factor in approaches to “hardening” current information systems is the 
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perceived or expected business requirements to maintain backward compatibility for legacy applications 
(Microsoft 2006). 
Any access control system fundamentally depends upon a trusted base for safe and reliable operation, commonly 
referred to as a “trusted computing-base (TCB)”.  Without a TCB, any control structures are subject to 
compromise.  In the past, access control paradigms have been based around fundamentals in operating systems, 
DBMS and similar IT products.  With the ubiquity of information systems, this paper proposes that access 
control requirements need to be defined against the background of the relevant industries served by such 
systems.    
Information Protection in the Health Sector 
A security analysis report published by the USA GAO (GAO 2007) reveals that the USA Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) has initiated actions to identify solutions for protecting personal health information.  
An overall approach for integrating HHS systems with various privacy related initiatives and for addressing 
security has not yet been defined. GAO identifies key challenges associated with protecting electronic personal 
health information in four areas.  Two particular areas are relevant to this paper: understanding and resolving 
legal and policy issues, and implementing adequate security measures for protecting health information.  This 
paper proposes a viable approach which provides the potential for sustainable security measures to protect the 
privacy and security of health information under an overall trusted health informatics scheme. 
Health Information System Architectures  
A modern HIS architecture would normally consist of health application services, middleware, database 
management system (DBMS), data network control system, operating system and hardware, as shown as in 
Table 1 (c).  Many application users wrongly believe that they have sophisticated security at this level since their 
applications provide role-based access control or equivalent. It should be understood that no matter what 
security measures are supported at the application level they are only ever going to be superficial to the 
knowledgeable adversary or malicious insiders.  This approach has a significant limitation in that the overall 
system can be no more secure than the operating system upon which the applications depend.  The operating 
system itself can be no more secure than the firmware and hardware facilities of the computer on which it 
operates.  Likewise, any other software component set, such as “middleware”, DBMS, network interface 
structure or “stack”, is constructed above the operating system and so totally depends upon security functions 
provided by the operating system as well as the robustness of that operating system against attack.   
Table 1: (a) OSI Model, (b) TCP/IP Model and (c) General HIS Architecture 
 (a)OSI Model  (b)TCP/IP Model (c) HIS Architecture  
Application 
Presentation 
Application 
Health service application 
Middleware 
DBMS 
Session (not present) 
Transport Transport 
Network Internetwork So
ft
w
ar
e 
Sy
st
em
 
C
om
po
ne
nt
s 
 
Data Link 
Data network management system  
Operating system 
Hardware  Physical 
Network Access 
Hardware 
Open Trusted Health Informatics Scheme (OTHIS) 
To achieve a high level of information assurance in HIS, our research to date has indicated that an overall 
trusted HIS involves the definition of structures at a number of levels in computer hardware, operating system, 
data network control system and health service applications.  We propose the Open Trusted Health Informatics 
Scheme (OTHIS) which is aimed at addressing privacy and security requirements in a holistic manner.  OTHIS 
defines privacy and security requirements at each level within the general HIS architecture to ensure the 
protection of data from both internal and external threats as well as providing conformance of HIS to meet 
regulatory and legal requirements.   
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OTHIS Structure  
The OSI reference model (ISO 7289-1) (Table 1(a)) is well known and acknowledged as a baseline for 
categorisation of network communication functions and assessment.  In fact, a fully operational system based on 
the seven-layer OSI model never attained strong market acceptance.  The OSI model envisaged management and 
control facilities existing at each layer but many of the detailed specifications and activities at each layer were 
never completed.  Instead, TCP/IP (Table 1(b)) is the model used globally for large scale structures in network 
communications.  The TCP/IP model does not exactly match the OSI model (Table 1(a)), however the processes 
defined in the OSI model are contained in the TCP/IP layers.  Normally HIS are based around distributed 
network systems, therefore it is entirely appropriate to relate the general HIS architecture to the OSI model as 
well as the TCP/IP model (Table 1).  Our research aims to relate and describe the roles and functions performed 
by each module of the OTHIS architecture, and how they fit into the layers of the OSI and TCP/IP models in a 
healthcare environment.   
It should be noted that the OSI model and HIS architecture can also be categorised into software and hardware 
components.  From the point of view of this paper the first group, software system components, will be 
addressed.  The interpretation of the requirements for appropriate levels of data granularity security in healthcare 
is the basis of this paper and research work performed to date. 
Health Informatics Access Control (HIAC) Model  
An operating system is a set of software programs that manages the hardware and software resources of a 
computer between the Physical layer and the Application layer of the OSI model and also forms a platform for 
other system software and application software.  It is an inherently futile exercise to attempt to build an 
application requiring high levels of trust in security and privacy when the underlying structure within the 
computer system is a non-trusted operating system.  The trusted application relies totally upon the non-trusted 
operating system to access low level services.  The authors contend that ICT is now sufficiently advanced that a 
MAC-based electronic healthcare management system is feasible.  Our research to date has indicated that 
current operating system structures need to be updated for HIS needs.  The Health Informatics Access Control 
(HIAC) model within the OTHIS architecture is our approach to overcoming many of the privacy and security 
issues which have plagued previous attempts at electronic health management systems.  HIAC is based on the 
MAC/RBAC type of operating system which primarily satisfies the requirement for confidentiality of records 
(this is a major impediment in current and previous systems).  The HIS is then developed atop the trusted 
operating system.  
Analysis of HIS Access Parameters 
Table 2: Analysis of HIS Access Parameters 
User role Capability DAC RBAC MAC HIAC 
Clinicians/ 
office 
administrator 
User  
access 
Access privileges 
determined and 
set by ICT system 
administrator 
Access privileges 
determined and 
set (normally) by 
applications or 
DBMS/OS   
Access determined 
for each system 
object (e.g. record) 
as per set policy 
As per MAC 
Data  
custodian 
Determine 
access rights 
Tells ICT system 
administrator who 
can see what 
Tells ICT system 
administrator who 
has what role 
Specify (possibly 
create) an 
appropriate profile 
for each user (or 
role with RBAC)  
Use suitable profiling 
language to define 
HIAC parameters 
CEO/CIO Determine policy  
Set organisation 
general policy 
Determines types 
of roles to suit 
organisation  
Define detailed 
access policy  
Defines 
organisational policy 
sets and emergency 
overrides parameters 
using natural 
language 
ICT system 
administrator 
Set access 
rights  
Directly program 
who sees what As per DAC 
Upload (possibly 
create) policy 
settings determined 
by CIO 
Upload and manage 
HIAC profiles 
Internal 
adversary 
(disgruntled 
employee) 
User access 
Can access 
records 
inappropriately or 
feed information 
to external 
adversary  
As per DAC but 
more restricted 
access 
Access limited to 
objects (records) as 
allowed by relevant 
policy 
HIAC profiles limit 
violations 
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User role Capability DAC RBAC MAC HIAC 
External 
adversary  
(e.g. hacker ) 
Penetrate to 
obtain user 
access 
and/or set 
access rights 
Uses 
Trojans/viruses, 
social engineering 
or other illicit 
means to gain 
total access  
As per DAC 
Cannot gain overall 
control: limited to 
social engineering 
(e.g. gain user 
password for 
individual’s user 
access) 
Requires infeasible 
levels of knowledge 
and covert access 
(further limited by 
dynamic risk 
protection 
mechanisms) 
As indicated in Table 2, the MAC-based system can provide the ability to limit access to only legitimate 
authorised users.  In general, the organisational security policies are defined by the CEO/CIO. Access privileges 
are determined by the data custodians.  The HIAC profiling mechanism allows for the system administrator to 
configure the organisational access policies defined and determined by the CEO/CIO and the data custodian.  
With MAC the access privileges of all users are equally bound by the policy, not set by the discretion of the 
file/program owners as with DAC.  The internal adversary or disgruntled employee will not be able to access 
health information inappropriately or even through giving unauthorised information to an external adversary.  
The MAC mechanism can protect the system from malicious or flawed applications which can potentially 
damage or destroy the system and its information.  This can prevent an external adversary penetrating the system 
by exploiting Trojan horse attacks, viruses, malware, social engineering or other illicit means to gain total access 
control or to tamper with audit systems.   
HIAC Implementation 
HIAC Platform 
For general applications, currently available products that support the MAC principles of trusted operating 
systems include “Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) Version 5, “Fedora Core 6”, and “Sun Microsystems 
Solaris 10 with Trusted Extensions Software”.  The HIAC model exploits the privacy- and security-
enhancement features of such trusted operating systems in the healthcare environment.  The end result is a 
dedicated trusted HIS which satisfies all privacy and security requirements.   To determine the practical viability 
of a HIAC model for HIS a demonstrator, based on the Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) operating system 
with both the MAC and RBAC approaches, was created (Henricksen, Caelli & Croll 2007).  SELinux is based 
on a flexible, fine-grained MAC architecture named Flask (NSA 2000).  The HIAC model is necessarily MAC-
based accompanied by RBAC properties for flexibility and a refined level of granularity.  This degree of 
simultaneous control and flexibility is not achievable with DAC, RBAC or MAC individually.   
Protection of Health Service Application Data from the Operating System Level 
Redhat’s SELinux enforces domain separation by ‘sandboxes’ known as protected zones to prevent processes 
and applications interfering with each other, such that an unauthorised process cannot gain overall control of the 
system as with DAC.  For example, a sandbox in the application level can be created to protect health service 
applications accessing health data isolated from another sandbox for general activities allowing a Web browser 
to access the Internet.  Unless explicitly permitted, the Web browser is not allowed to access the health data, nor 
is the health service application permitted to explore the Internet as the Web browser.  Once an adversary 
attacks a DAC system through the network and manages to obtain super-user access privileges, the entire system 
is subverted.  With SELinux however the adversary would control only a single sandbox, and would need to 
launch additional exploits, each of which becomes increasingly infeasible with distance from the network.   
Creation of SELinux Proxy at the Application Level 
A large scale HIS may involve dynamic and frequent changes to the security policies and security servers such 
as adding/deleting users and applications.  Once the request for the change is made, the SELinux policy needs to 
be modified and the security server is required to be recompiled manually.  In order to provide the minimum of 
disruption to the system operation and avoid creating additional complex interactions between application and 
operating system level objects, a proxy is suggested.  The proxy operates at the application level and is protected 
in its own sandbox by SELinux.  The proxy regulates access by application-level processes to protect data, using 
its own set of configuration files.  This solution can be seen as nested SELinux, whereby the proxy represents a 
micro-instance of SELinux that deals only with application data.  Operating system level processes see only a 
monolithic object (the proxy) representing application processes, meaning that the number of configuration rules 
between the two layers is linear rather than exponential.   
Proxy Operation   
The operation of the proxy mirrors the SELinux mechanism.  SELinux separates the policy decision-making 
logic unit from the policy enforcement logic unit, as shown in Figure 1.  For example, a subject X requests to 
access an object Y in the system.  The policy enforcement server unit queries the security server unit for making 
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an access decision. The security server unit makes the access decision based upon Y’s security class and X’s 
security attribute from the security policy database.   The access decision is made by the security server and is 
then relayed to the policy enforcement server unit.  
In the proxy model, a client interacts with the proxy via a pair of Client and Server messages. For each client 
message received, the proxy sends exactly one server message.  In the client message, the client authenticates 
itself to the proxy with its credentials.  Until the next such message is received, the proxy caches the credentials.  
This mimics the SELinux mechanism, which authenticates a user via a password before transitioning the user 
into the requested role.  The proxy responds to the credentialled message.   The credentials are evaluated 
whenever the client requests access to a record in the proxy database.  The proxy passes the credentials with the 
record identifier and the policy to the security filter.  The security filter assesses the credentials, decides whether 
the record can be accessed in the way intended and passes this decision to the proxy.  Whereas SELinux can 
protect data to the granularity of the file, the proxy has arbitrary granularity, as determined by tags exchanged 
between the proxy and its client. The client may wish to retrieve a single word from a database, or an entire 
collection of files. Our mechanism allows this with as little as a single configuration, although for more complex 
cases, the number of configuration rules will increase linearly in the number of database items.   
  
Figure 1: Proxy operation 
There are some cases when records must be accessible even in the absence of legitimate credentials.  For 
example, if the authorised viewer of a patient’s case file is not present, but the patient requires emergency 
treatment, then the availability of the information is more important than its privacy.  Thus, the proxy is 
programmed to respond to a special role of ‘Emergency’, in which case it moves into auditing mode, until a new 
set of credentials with a differing role is provided.  In auditing mode, all records can be retrieved and modified, 
but each action is recorded and flagged for review by the security administrator.  Appropriate punishment for 
abusing this mode can be meted out at a social level.  Our prototype does not handle differential records, 
whereby the differences between subsequent versions of records are stored, although this would be 
advantageous for malicious or accidental modification of records in auditing mode. 
Although the proxy significantly simplifies configuration of application data, it does not address problems at the 
operating-system level that need to be resolved.  Further research in this area needs to focus on simplifying the 
generic SELinux configuration, to allow realistic deployment of “strict” SELinux, which supports protection of 
application data.  This is indeed happening, as witnessed by the development of modular policy logic in Fedora 
Core 5, which allows the configuration to be developed and loaded in blocks relating to the processes or 
daemons being protected.  The efficacy of this strategy has yet to be solidly determined. 
HIAC Features 
HIAC incorporates RBAC which complements contemporary MAC systems by ensuring more flexibility over 
the more traditional MAC standalone systems.  In practice this approach gives more flexibility than in the 
traditional MAC where accesses are granted to individual persons.  The proxy model also includes the extended 
RBAC model with the function of inheritance of permissions with a role hierarchy, so that the policy 
configuration can be simplified through the use of role inheritance within hierarchies.  The HIAC model 
includes the principle of least privilege and also enforces domain separation through the use of sandboxes within 
Redhat’s SELinux.  These help prevent applications interfering with each other such that an unauthorised user 
cannot gain overall control of the system as with DAC.   
To date Australian privacy laws and health-related privacy legislation prescribe no particular technology to 
protect personal information.  For instance under the Information Privacy Principles (IPP) of the Privacy Act 
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1988 (Principle 4 – Storage and security of personal information) Principle 4 (a) requires an organisation to take 
reasonable steps to protect personal information.  The National Privacy Principles (NPP) in the Privacy 
Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 also requires a record-keeper to protect personal information by security 
safeguards as is reasonable.  No specific security mechanisms are specified in both the IPP and NPP, thus any 
reasonable and adequate security measures are allowed for protecting personal information.  The HIAC structure 
enables an effective safeguard strategy for the protection of the confidentiality of individual health information 
to assist the healthcare industry to comply with Australian privacy legislative and regulatory requirements.  
Australia’s privacy regime is currently under review.  This research will continue to observe the update of 
privacy and e-health privacy legislation in Australia, in order to design the OTHIS architecture for legal 
compliance. 
In general HIAC provides for maximum flexibility within a strongly secure environment. This means that it 
provides the potential for achieving a balance between security needs and flexibility of implementation, which is 
primarily determined from a privacy risk assessment.  For example HIAC provides the flexibility of having 
timely access control to assist information resources with an emergency override function by switching to the 
emergency policy in emergency circumstances.  Full auditing of the system deters potential abuses of this 
flexibility.  A major area for future research concerns the simplification of the MAC profile definition.  At 
present the methods and processes needed to define and deploy a mandatory security policy within an overall 
HIS are complex and could be considered to be beyond the expertise level of many CIO in health related 
organisations.  Integration of such security profiling structures is required in relation to such other enterprise 
systems as overall human resource management systems and the like.  This allows for definition and deployment 
of security policies that represent legal, regulatory, policy and enterprise level requirements for reliable and 
consistent enforcement at the computer system level. This future research requires the definition and 
implementation of appropriate interfaces between such large scale enterprise systems and the proposed HIAC 
structure.   
Protection and Enforcement using Cryptography in OTHIS 
Cryptographic technologies have long been used for integrity and confidentiality purposes.  Large numbers of 
security-related tools use encryption to protect sensitive information, particularly to maintain privacy. It is 
important to understand that the principle role of cryptography is to ensure the quality of service of the 
technology, and thus ensure that the technology satisfies the business requirements of the system.  Cryptography 
then is primarily an enabler of services.  Detection and prevention of security breaches is a subset of this 
primary function. For integrity, a "keyed hash function" may be applied to each relevant data record to prevent 
unauthorised insertion of records as well as unauthorised alteration of existing records. An unauthorised third 
party (or an authorised party extending beyond their authorisation) would need to possess the necessary key to 
either create or recreate the integrity enforcing checksum, commonly referred as a "message authentication code 
(MAC)".  Confidentiality can be enforced using a single-key cipher, but key management structures to allow for 
multiple roles to have access to a healthcare record would be necessarily complex. As such, maintaining record 
confidentiality using public key cipher schemes may be advantageous.  Historically with this approach, a 
performance penalty may have been involved, but with current hardware bases for the implementation of these 
ciphers, such performance problems are normally minimal.   
Our research intends to investigate the use of suitable cryptographic techniques embedded into the OTHIS 
architecture for protecting confidentiality and security of personal health data.  Encryption should be used, and 
normally is used, to protect data in transit for complete end-to-end protection, including within the node systems 
at each end of a connection.  Data in storage should also be encrypted for end-point security against 
unauthorised or accidental access or eavesdropping.  Identity-based encryption mechanisms may be used for 
identity and/or role management in the healthcare environment.  An assessment of suitable cryptographic 
services and mechanisms for the healthcare sector will be undertaken.  Cryptographic integration in the UK, 
USA and New Zealand healthcare sectors will be investigated.  A particularly relevant contribution envisaged 
from protection and enforcement using cryptography in OTHIS is the elucidation of the requirements for the 
integration and management of such cryptographic systems in OTHIS for enforcement of privacy and security of 
electronic health data.   
Conclusion 
Our research indicates that an overall trusted HIS should implement security at all levels of its architecture to 
ensure the protection of personal privacy and security of electronic health information.  From an information 
security perspective, we propose OTHIS for the overall HIS architecture.  This paper relates an HIS architecture 
to two internationally recognised standards, the OSI reference model and the TCP/IP model, to describe how 
OTHIS fits into these reference models in a HIS.  A development of the OTHIS architecture comprises a number 
of modules with viable and suitable security mechanisms to achieve a high level of security, including the HIAC 
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model.  HIAC is a trustworthy access control mechanism to provide the privacy and security of personal health 
data at the levels of health service application, DBMS, middleware, network control system and operating 
systems in HIS.  HIAC is proposed as a viable solution which has the potential to address the common types of 
information privacy violations and weaknesses illustrated by the recent access control management scenarios 
from Australia, the UK and the USA. 
This paper contends that it is both timely and desirable to move electronic HIS towards privacy- and security-
aware applications that reside atop a trusted computing-based operating system.  Such systems have the real-
world potential to satisfy all stakeholder requirements including modern information structures, organisational 
policies, legislative and regulatory requirements for both healthcare providers and healthcare consumers 
(privacy and security), and flexible operational demands in HIS.  This paper emphasises the need for well-
directed research into the application of inherent privacy- and security-enhanced operating systems to provide 
viable, real-world trusted HIS.  The authors propose an HIAC model which has the potential to fulfil these 
requirements.  Future work will be continuing on the development of the other modules within the proposed 
OTHIS structure with the ultimate goals of maximum sustainability, flexibility, performance, manageability, 
ease of use and understanding, scalability and legal compliance included in the healthcare environment.   
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